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A STUDY OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 2003: 
CAN TORT REFORM BENEFIT ARKANSAS? 
By Scott Jackson 
Department of Finance 
Advisor: Dr. John M. Norwood 
Department of Accounting 
Abstract: 
Without question, reforming America's civil justice system 
has become a hot button issue in today's political landscape. 
While most Americans move about their daily lives without 
giving the subject a second thought, politicians ranging from 
aspiring state assemblymen to the recently reelected George W 
Bush have placed tort reform at the forefront of American 
political affairs. Although problems plaguing American courts 
have been discussed for years, criticism of America's current 
system for adjudicating tort cases has reached a fever pitch. 
Among the more vocal critics are poweifullobbyist groups, such 
as the American Medical Association (AMA) and the American 
Tort Reform Association (ATRA), who believe the current civil 
justice system is responsible for increases in liability insurance, 
a decrease in the quality of health care, and an overall increase 
in the cost of doing business. Opposing groups, such as the 
Association ofTrial Lawyers of America (ATIA}, believe it is the 
right of eve!'}' American consumer to have their day in court and 
punish corporations and doctors for committing civil offenses 
against them. And sandwiched in the middle of this fiasco are the 
thousands of politicians, businessmen, doctors, and ordinary 
citizens who are left scratching their heads when they tl'}' and 
figure it all out. 
This paper attempts to explain the debate surrounding tort 
reform on both the national and state levels. Further, it 
summarizes each section of Arkansas Act 649 of 2003, better 
known as the Civil Justice Reform Act of2003 (the "Act"), and 
point to any obvious benefits to the business community as a 
result of the reforms. A more challenging topic this paper covers 
is whether or not tort reform, specifically the Act, will provide 
future economic benefits to the state of Arkansas. This paper 
attempts to make the direct link beMeen legal reforms and 
increases in economic output as measured by personal income 
levels. The model is intended to be VCI'}' simplistic yet still 
provide a picture of how tort reform may or may not benefit 
Arkansas' economy in the future. 
The Growing Debate: 
By now most Americans have at least heard of the 
McDonald's hot coffee case. The case involved Stella Liebeck 
of Albuquerque, New Mexico suing her local McDonald's fast 
food restaurant when she spilled hot coffee on herself after 
making the purchase at the drive-through window. Liebeck was 
awarded $200,000 in compensatory damages and $2.7 million, 
two days of McDonald's coffee sales, in punitive damages. The 
award for punitive damages was later reduced by the trial court 
judge to $480,000 (iCan2000, n.d.)l. Both sides appealed, but 
before the appellate court could rule on the matter, the case was 
settled. This case can serve almost single-handedly as the 
measuring stick with which to gauge whether or not one is for or 
against tort reform. Many Americans will see the headlines in 
the paper, "Woman Awarded $2.7 Million for Spilling Coffee," 
and make the judgment that the courts are out of control in 
awarding millions in what can only be described as frivolous 
lawsuits. Others will say that Liebeck received adequate 
compensation from a negligent business that was serving coffee 
at around 185 degrees with no warning as to how hot the coffee 
really was. They would also point out that this case shows that 
the current system provides a mechanism to reduce unusually 
large jury awards. Thus, in this example, one may begin to see 
the makings of the current tort reform debate that has grabbed the 
attention of both the federal and state governments. 
On the federal level, the debate has led to many failed 
attempts by Congress to pass measures involving the limitation 
of medical liability, class action status, punitive damages, or any 
other civil justice reform. Although proponents of tort reform 
have a tremendous amount of support in the Republican Congress. 
Senate Republicans have yet to gamer enough votes to stop the 
Democrats' filibuster on all things related to reform. Tort reform 
proponents were able to score a victory earlier this year regarding 
class action lawsuits, with the passage of the Class Action 
Fairness Act (CAFA). However, on most of the major reform 
issues, tort law reformers have failed to win any major battles on 
Capitol Hill. 
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Backed by the ATLA, opponents of reform have plenty of 
firepower to win the support of key congressional leaders and 
fight off pushes to reform the system. ATLA CEO John Haber 
states, "I don't agree [that business interests] have traction with 
Joe Sixpack. Average Americans don't want a system that's 
tilted so it works for the rich and powerful" (as cited in Dunham, 
2005, p. 53). In general, there is a belief among tort reform 
opponents that ordinary citizens are able to, in effect, police 
companies and doctors through lawsuits involving torts. When 
a business places a faulty product on the market that may cause 
harm, or a doctor commits medical malpractice, reform opponents 
believe it is the consumer that has a right to go after that business 
or doctor and prevent such action from occurring again in the 
future. According to the organization's mission statement, 
A TLA is in place to "champion the cause of those who deserve 
redress for injury to person or property," and to "promote the 
public good through concerted efforts to secure safe products, a 
safe workplace, a clean environment, and quality health care" 
(ATLA Mission, 2005). 
It is the notion of using the courts as an equalizer that 
pushes some trial lawyers, such as Senator John Edwards (D-
North Carolina), into the consumer protection spotlight. Sen. 
Edwards made a name for himself by representing clients who 
were injured by the negligence of corporations and doctors. 
With the attention turned to Sen. Edwards in the 2004 presidential 
race, tort reform opponents seized the opportunity to publicly 
state their opposition to limitations on the consumer's ability to 
file suit with stories from Sen. Edwards' career as an attorney. 
One case cited numerous times throughout the campaign involved 
a five year old child named Valerie Lakey. Valerie, according to 
Sen. Edwards' book Four Trials (2004), was disemboweled by 
a faulty pool drain cover in 1993. The case made the Senator 
famous when the jury awarded the Lakey's $25 million. Cases 
such as the Lakey's are often cited by tort reform opponents to 
show how the system successfully acts as the great equalizer 
between victims of civil offenses and negligent parties. 
Opponents of tort reform face an equally powerful group of 
lobbyists looking to reform America's civil justice system. 
Organizations such as the AMA, A TRA, and other groups 
representing insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, 
health maintenance organizations, doctors, and hospitals are 
fighting to win the war on tort reform. These organizations are 
carved out of the belief that tort litigation has led to an increased 
cost of doing business and a decrease in the quality of health care. 
With President Bush back in office and a greater number of 
Republicans in both the House and the Senate, reform proponents 
believe they have gained new life in the tort reform debate. 
President Bush stated in 2000, 
From people across America, I am hearing that our 
legal system needs reform. That our courts aren't 
se.rving the people, they are serving the lawyers. That 
fnvolous lawsuits are hurting people. Some think this 
special interest group is too powerful to take on. That 
money determines everything. This is not an 
argument; it is an excuse. This cause is not hopeless. 
("George W. Bush on", 2000). 
President Bush again pushed tort reform in the 2004 
presidential campaign, and since his reelection has placed reform 
near the top of his agenda (Dobbs, 2005). 
One of the largest organizations fighting for reforming 
America's civil justice system is the AMA. The organization 
leads the way in pushing for legislation to limit the number and 
severity of medical liability lawsuits. The AMA states, "The 
crisis is threatening access to care for patients in states without 
liability reforms" (American Medical Association, 2004a). The 
organization encourages its membership to contact its respective 
Senators and Representatives to promote passage of a 
comprehensive liability reform package. To aid in the effort, the 
AMA has released a "physician action kit"2 providing information 
and talking points on the subject of medical liability reform. The 
organization also releases routinely cited information regarding 
which states it considers to be crisis states when it comes to 
medical liability. The current count stands at 20 crisis states and 
24 states showing problem signs (American Medical Association, 
2004b). 
Leading the way for the business community is ATRA. 
The organization claims to represent "more than 300 businesses, 
corporations, municipalities, associations, and professional 
firms," in its quest for a more fair civil justice system (American 
Tort Reform Association, 2005a). The group cites 3M, Caterpillar, 
Boeing, and Pfizer among its members. Even with all of this 
support, A TRA has yet to persuade Congress to pass legislation 
that would completely overhaul the way tort cases are carried out 
in this country. Yet, ATRA fights on. President of ATRA 
Sherman Joyce states, 
Some astonishing decisions come out of the courts· 
these days. Hundreds of millions in punitive damages 
piled on top of relatively minor actual damages. 
Meritless cases settled because defendants fear the 
outcome of an emotion-filled jury trial or a lawless 
court. That's why the American Tort Reform 
Association (ATRA) leads the fight for a better civil 
justice system- one that's fair, efficient and predictable 
(American Tort Reform Association, 2005b). 
The AMA and A TRA along with other organizations 
continue to press Congress to pass comprehensive tort reforrri~ 
Without it, these organizations believe the American economy 
will be negatively impacted for years to come. · 
Arkansas' Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003: 
Arkansas' version of tort reform, the Civil Justice Reform . 
Act of 2003, was signed into law by Governor Mike Huckabee -
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on March 25, 2003. The Act was passed by the Senate with a vote 
of 34 to 1, while the House passed the bill 71 to 28. 
The Act lays out many changes to the civil justice system 
in Arkansas. According to an article published in The Arkansas 
Lawyer, some of the more visible reforms include ( 1) modification 
of joint and several liability, (2) limits to the amount awarded for 
punitive damages, and (3) revisions of rules regarding medical 
injury actions (Leflar, n.d.). While only these three major areas 
of reform are discussed below, the Act also reforms many other 
less visible yet still significant areas of Arkansas' tort system. 
The following attempts to simplify the modifications set forth in 
the Act. This discussion is designed to follow the organization 
of the Act as it was passed by the legislature. It does not directly 
follow the organization of the law as codified in Ark. Code Ann. 
BB 16-55-201 to -220, 16-114-206, and 16-114-208 to -212. 
Joint and Several Liability 
The first section of the Act calls for the modification of 
joint and several liability. According to this section, 
In any action for personal injury, medical injury, 
property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of 
each defendant for compensatory orpunitive damages 
shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each 
defendant shall be liable only for the amount of 
damages allocated to that defendant in direct 
proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, 
and a separate several judgment shall be rendered 
against that defendant for that amount (Arkansas 
General Assembly, 2003, Section 1 (a)). 
Prior to the Act, liability for damages in civil cases involving 
multiple defendants was not divided between each defendant. 
For example, assume two defendants were found negligent for 
personal injury in a car accident and were ordered to pay $1 
million in compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant A 
was responsible for 90 percent of the damages caused by the 
accident, while Defendant B was responsible for only 10 percent 
of the damages. If Defendant A was only able to pay $10,000 due 
to insufficient funds, then Defendant B, regardless of his 
percentage of fault, would be required to come up with the 
remaining balance of $990,000 if he is solvent. In other words, 
the amount paid in damages by each defendant is not directly 
proportional to the percentage of fault. 
Section One of the Act attempts to remove the inconsistency 
that exist between the amount each defendant is ordered to pay 
and his/her percentage of fault. Using the same example from 
above, since Defendant A was responsible for 90 percent of the 
damages, he must pay 90 percent of the award amount, or 
$900,000. Defendant B would only be responsible for his 
percentage of fault. In this example, he would pay 10 percent of 
the damages, or $100,000, versus the more than $900,000 he 
would pay in the previous example. This example holds true 
unless one or more of the defendants is insolvent. If that is the 
case, the Act calls for a graduated increase in the percentage a 
defendant must pay as described in Section Three of the Act, 
discussed later in this paper. As a general overview of the new 
joint and several liability provisions, however, the simplified 
example above holds. 
Section Two of the Act further details the procedures that 
are to be used in assessing percentage of fault. Mainly, this 
section deals with the liability of parties not directly named in the 
suit. Under the Act, awards must be adjusted based on the 
percentage of fault of such nonparties. If the defendant can show 
a nonparty was liable for some of the damages, then the award 
amount must take into consideration the proportion of damages 
for which that person is responsible. According to The Arkansas 
Lawyer, 
These nonparties to whom fault could be assigned 
might include out-of-state or foreign firms that cannot 
be sued for lack of personal jurisdiction; persons or 
entities protected by sovereign, charitable, or 
intrafamily immunities; employers whose negligence 
was one cause of injury to an employee suing a third 
party such as a product manufacturer; persons or 
entities without assets "not worth suing"; and persons 
whose location and perhaps even identity is unknown 
(Leflar, n.d.). 
The Act specifies that fault of a nonparty can be considered 
either if the plaintiff enters into a settlement with that particular 
nonparty, or if the defendant can show that the nonparty was 
either partially or wholly at fault. As laid out in Section Two, the 
defense must file a pleading with the court stating the identity of 
the nonparty along with why the defense believes that party to be 
at fault in the particular matter. The pleadings regarding the 
percentage of fault of persons not named in the suit must be filed 
no later than 120 days prior to the date on which the trial is set to 
begin. Importantly, the Act also states that if the fact finder 
assesses fault to a nonparty based on a settlement with the 
plaintiff or a pleading filed by the defense, the findings of fault 
do not subject the nonparty to any liability with regards to current 
matter. 
Section Three of the Act also relates to joint and several 
liability reforms. This section calls for graduated increases in the 
percentage points a defendant is ordered to pay if it is determined 
that other defendants found liable in the suit are not able to make· 
full payment. In other words, if one defendant is insolvent, the 
other defendants may have to cover some of the funds that were 
to be provided by the insolvent defendant. In order to accomplish 
this, the Act sets up three levels of liability where the defendant 
determined to be the most responsible for the damages incurs 
most of the burden, and the defendant that is least responsible for 
the damages incurs the least amount of the burden. The first level 
of liability involves those defendants whose percentage of fault 
is no more than ten percent. If a defendant meets this criterion, 
then that defendant shall not be subject to any increase in his 
share of the damages owed. The second level of liability 
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involves those defendants whose percentage of fault is greater 
than ten percent but less than 50 percent. Defendants that fall into 
this category may see their proportion of the damages owed 
increase by up to ten percentage points if another defendant is 
unable to make payment. The final level ofliability encompasses 
defendants whose percentage of fault is determined to be 50 
percent or greater. Defendants in this grouping may see an 
increase of as much as twenty percentage points in their amount 
of damages owed should another defendant become insolvent. 
It is easy to see how Arkansas businesses will benefit from 
refom1ing the joint and several liability rules that were in place 
prior to passage of the Act. Under the new provisions, businesses 
are able to limit their share of liability in certain situations. For 
example, assume a customer of a small, locally owned retail 
establishment is injured while taking an item off of a shelf. The 
customer sues the retail business and is awarded $100,000 in 
punitive and compensatory damages. Under the old law, the 
business must pay the entire $100,000 in damages. Today, with 
the new law in place, the business may be able to show that either 
another named defendant or even a nonparty is partially to blame 
for the accident. Continuing, assume the trier of fact determines 
that the defendant was responsible for only 20 percent of the fault 
while a nonparty was responsible for the other 80 percent, then 
the business would only have to pay $20,000, or 20 percent of the 
damages. As is the case with many small businesses in Arkansas, 
the difference in paying $20,000 and paying $100,000 can be the 
difference between staying in business and closing the doors for 
good. Of course, this is only a simplified hypothetical situation, 
but one can easily see that the changes made to joint and several 
liability can greatly impact a business's bottom line. 
Punitive Damages 
The second major reform imposed by the Civil Justice 
Reform Act of2003 pertains to punitive damages. According to 
Black's Law Dictionary, punitive damages are "damages awarded 
in addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with 
recklessness, malice, or deceit" (Gamer, 2001, p. 171). Section 
Nine of the Act is the first section to deal with the subject. This 
section states that if a court is to award punitive damages in a civil 
case, the plaintiff must first show that the defendant is liable for 
compensatory damages. Therefore, if a court rules in favor of the 
defendant and awards no compensatory damages, the plaintiff 
has no claim with regards to punitive damages. Beyond proving 
liability for compensatory damages, the plaintiff must also meet 
either of the following aspects as they relate to a particular case: 
(1) That the defendant knew or ought to have known, 
in light of the surrounding circumstances, that his or 
her conduct would naturally and probably result in 
injury or damage and that he or she continued the 
conduct with malice or in reckless disregard of the 
consequences from which malice may be inferred 
(Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, Section 9 (1)). 
(2) That the defendant intentionally pursued a course 
of conduct for the purpose of causing injury or damage 
(Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, Section 9 (2)). 
Providing the plaintiff can show that the defendant's actions 
meet either one of the above criterion, the plaintiff may then 
proceed to petition the court to award punitive damages, although 
the Act states the plaintiff has no right to receive a punitive 
damages award. 
Section 11 of the Act pertains to one of the more controversial 
and heavily debated reforms put into place by the Act. This 
section limits the amount of punitive damages that may be 
awarded in a civil case. According to the Act, punitive damages 
awarded by a court must not exceed the greater of (1) $250,000 
or (2) three times the amount awarded for compensatory damages 
not to exceed $1,000,000. Further, Section 11 requires that every 
three years beginning January I, 2006 the limits on punitive 
damages set forth by the Act are to be adjusted for inflation in 
accordance with the Consumer Price Index. 
To illustrate the punitive damage caps imposed by the Act, 
suppose, hypothetically, a consumer is severely injured by a 
razor while shaving. The consumer meets with an attorney and 
decides to pursue legal action against the maker of that particular 
razor blade. Upon completion of the trial, the trier of fact 
determines that the company was indeed liable for the injuries 
sustained by the plaintiff, the consumer, and awards $20,000 in 
compensatory damages to cover medical expenses. Now assume 
the plaintiff can prove that the defendant knew of the defective 
razors but chose not to act on this information. In light of this 
information, the plaintiff may be awarded as much as $250,000 
in punitive damages since, as stated in the Act, this amount is the 
greater of the two punitive damage caps. If the plaintiff were 
awarded compensatory damages totaling more than $83,333, 
then the plaintiff may be awarded punitive damages in the 
amount of three times compensatory damages but less than 
$1,000,000. Again, this is only a hypothetical example and is 
oversimplified to communicate the basic aspects of the Act. 
Section 11 also allows for exceptional cases in which the 
plaintiff may recover more than the amount specified by the 
damage caps. The Act states, 
When the fact finder determines by clear and 
convincing evidence that, at the time of the injury, the 
defendant intentionally pursued a course of conduct 
for the purpose of causing injury or damage and 
determines that the defendant's conduct did, in fact, 
harm the plaintiff, then (the caps stated previously) 
shall not apply (Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, 
Section 11 (b)). 
Therefore, continuing with the example regarding razor 
blades, if the plaintiff can show by "clear and convincing 
evidence" that the manufacturer of the razor blades intentionally 
sold defective razors in order to injure its customers, then the 
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amount awarded to the plaintiff for punitive damages is not 
subject to the restrictions detailed previously. It is important 
here to define "clear and convincing evidence." That is, "evidence 
indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or 
reasonably certain" (Gamer, 2001, p. 250). This burden of proof 
can be described as greater than a "preponderance of the evidence" 
used in civil cases but less than "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
used in criminal cases. 
Another major reform concerning punitive damages is the 
establishment of an option to request a bifurcated proceeding. 
According to Section 14 of the Act, "In any case in which 
punitive damages are sought, any party may request a bifurcated 
proceeding at least ten days prior to trial" (Arkansas General 
Assembly, 2003, Section 14 (a)). In other words, either party 
may request that the trial be divided into two stages. In the first 
stage, the trial would take place and the court would decide 
whether or not compensatory damages are to be awarded. If 
compensatory damages are awarded, then a second stage 
commences in which the court rules as to whether or not punitive 
damages are warranted and in what amount. Section 14 goes on 
to state that it is only during the second stage of the trial, the stage 
regarding punitive damages, that the financial condition of the 
defendant be admissible. 
Again, it is simple to see how the reforms regarding 
punitive damages may positively affect businesses involved in 
tort litigation. Prior to passage of the Act, a business may have 
been required to pay thousands or sometimes millions of dollars 
in punitive damages. Under the reforms laid out in the Act, the 
amount a business may be required to pay in punitive damages 
is reduced substantially provided the business did not intentionally 
cause the injury. If a particular business caused unintentional 
harm to the plaintiff and lost at trial, the most the defendant 
would be obligated to pay in punitive damages would total 
$1,000,000. Additionally, assuming compensatory damages 
equaled $83,333 or less, punitive damages could not exceed 
$250,000. Thus the savings to a business' bottom line can be 
substantial due to the reforms imposed by the Act. 
Medical Injury Reforms 
Finally, as is the case with many of the tort reforms enacted 
by states, the Act makes some significant changes to the 
procedures and rules governing cases involving medical injuries. 
The first of these reforms appears in Section 15 of the Act. 
Overturning previous case law, this section eradicates the 
collateral source rule. As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, the 
collateral source rule is "the doctrine that if an injured party 
receives compensation for the injuries from a source independent 
of the tortfeasor, the payment should not be deducted from the 
damages that the tortfeasor must pay" (Garner, 2001, p. 109). 
Although the Act does not limit the amount that may be awarded 
for compensatory damages, Section 15 does require that any 
payments made by an independent source to cover medical 
expenses be subtracted from the damages awarded. Mainly, 
Section 15 is designed to account for any money the plaintiff may 
have received from an insurance provider. If the insurance 
company already paid for all or part of the medical expenses, that 
amount is deducted from the compensatory damages award. 
Under the previous law, a medical care provider may have paid 
for all of the medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff because 
of the provider's negligent actions, even if the plaintiff had 
received reimbursement from an insurance provider. In essence, 
the complaining party may have collected double the 
compensation for his/her injuries. This is no longer the case 
because of the provisions set forth in Section 15 the Act. 
Section 18 ofthe Act establishes new procedures regarding 
the use of expert witnesses. According to this section, if it is 
determined that the negligent action for which the defendant is 
charged is not "within the jury's comprehension as a matter of 
common knowledge," the plaintiff bears the burden of showing 
that the injuries caused by the defendant should not have occurred 
(Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, Sec. 18). This can be 
accomplished through the testimony of an expert witness. The 
plaintiff by means of the expert witness, who must be of the same 
specialty as the defendant, must show that the defendant did not 
act within what is considered standard practice for that specialty 
and therefore caused the particular medical injury. The reason 
for employing such a provision is two fold. First, the use of an 
expert witness is designed to bridge the gap between what is 
considered common knowledge and what can be highly technical, 
medical terminology. Second, it prevents the plaintiff from 
bringing in a "hired gun" to testify about a specialty in which he/ 
she is not trained (Leflar, n.d.). In this way, Section 18limits a 
common measure used by plaintiffs in proving negligence on the 
part of the defendant. 
Section 20 of the Act also contains language pertaining to 
medical injury cases. Although the reforms made by Section 20 
appear subtle upon first glance (only 14 words were added to the 
existing law), the changes can have a substantial impact on the 
ability of the defendant to pay, and the plaintiff to receive, any 
damages awarded by the court. Previously, Arkansas law stated, 
"If the award for future damages exceeds $100,000 the court 
may, at the request of either party, order that the future 
damagesbbe paid in whole, or in part, by periodic payment" 
(Arkansas Code, G I 6-114-209). The key alteration made by the 
Act replaces the word "may" with "shall." Although this does 
not seem significant, the repercussions are noteworthy. In the 
past, the court had the ultimate say as to whether or not judgments 
against the defendant were to be paid up front or in periodic 
payments. Under the Act, the court is obligated to set periodic 
payments for damage awards at the request of either party. The 
financial benefit to medical providers is indeed substantial. For 
example, a judgment against the defendant in the amount of 
$500,000 could potentially render the defendant insolvent if a 
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lump sum payment is required. If the defendant requests 
periodic payment of the damages, the defendant may allocate 
future payments into his/her financial situation. Thus, not only 
is the defendant better able to recover from the loss incurred as 
a result of the lawsuit, the plaintiff is more likely to receive 
compensation for his/her injury. 
Section 21 of the Act sets new rules regarding what is 
termed, "False and unreasonable pleadings" in medical injury 
actions (Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, Section 21). This 
section, in line with previous law, forces the complaining party 
to pay for the costs, including attorney's fees, incurred by the 
defendant as a direct result of the filing of the case. Although 
previous state law required the same repayment for false and 
unreasonable pleadings as a means to reduce the number of 
unfounded claims, the Act goes one step further in allowing the 
court to place sanctions deemed appropriate on the party or 
attorney who filed the claim. The Act, however, does not specify 
what sanctions are considered appropriate. 
Section 21 also requires the plaintiff to submit an affidavit 
signed by an expert showing reasonable cause for filing a 
particular claim. The affidavit must state, 
(A) The expert's familiarity with the applicable 
standard of care in issue; 
(B) The expert's qualification; 
(C) The expert's opinion as to how the applicable 
standard of care has been breached; and 
(D) The expert's opinion as to how the breach of the 
applicable standard of care resulted in injury or death 
(Arkansas General Assembly, Section 21 (2)). 
This affidavit must be filed within 30 days of the time the 
complaint was originally filed, or the case will be dismissed by 
the court before ever going to trial. Again, provisions such as this 
were put into place to help curb the number of frivolous lawsuits 
filed against medical care providers in Arkansas. 
Section 22 lays out a number of reforms pertaining to 
medical injury actions. First, this section seeks to limit the 
liability exposure of medical care facilities (i.e. hospitals, nursing 
homes, clinics, etcO). The limitation of exposure is accomplished 
by placing the burden of proof on the complaining party in 
proving that the medical care provider was indeed an employee 
of the medical facility named as a codefendant. This provision 
prevents plaintiffs from attempting to hold a medical facility 
liable for injuries caused by a non-employee medical care 
provider at that facility. For example, if a non-employee doctor 
causes a medical injury while visiting a patient at a hospital, the 
plaintiff may not bring suit against the hospital since the doctor 
is not considered an employee of the facility. 
Section 22 also provides that surveys and inspections the 
plaintiff"seeks to use as evidence against a medical care provider 
must be relevant to the plaintiffs injury to be admissible at trial" 
(Arkansas General Assembly, 2003, Section 22). For instance, 
if a plaintiff is suing a hospital in the death of the plaintiffs 
newborn child, an inspection of the hospital's onsite pharmacy 
conducted by the State Board of Pharmacy would most likely be 
inadmissible. This of course assumes the pharmacy was in no 
way linked to the death of the child. Interestingly, this element 
of Section 22 applies only to the plaintiffs side of the case. If the 
defendant wishes to submit surveys or inspection results 
displaying the overall quality of the medical facility, the evidence 
would not be deemed inadmissible under Section 22 of the Act. 
The Economics of Tort Reform: 
The final piece of this thesis is to measure the impact of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003 on Arkansas' economy. With 
the introduction of this legislation to the state legislature in 2003, 
many argued that the reform package would bring economic 
prosperity as insurance premiums went down and industry 
flooded to the state. Indeed, it is still too soon to know the 
savings, if any, that the reforms have actually brought to Arkansas' 
businesses and citizens. However, using data collected from 
other states that have enacted tort reform bills over the last 
several decades, it is possible to project the savings to Arkansans 
within the next few years. 
Methodology 
In order to study the impact of tort reform passed in early 
2003 on Arkansas' economy, it is first necessary to study the 
relationship between tort reform enacted in other states and the 
impact on that state's economy. To accomplish this, I collected 
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis regarding each 
state's per capita personal income (PPI) from 1969 to 2003.3 I 
also collected data as to whether or not a state had enacted tort 
reform and in what year(s) the reforms were passed. This data 
was collected from the American Tort Reform Association.4 
This study defines tort reform as removal of traditional joint and 
several liability from a state's civil procedure or as the capping 
of punitive damages. By doing this, the model employed is able 
to better compare two of the most basic reforms of the Civil 
Justice Reform Act (joint and several liability reform and punitive 
damage caps) to reforms passed in other states. The model 
developed by the author, Dr. Jeff Collins5, and Dr. Cary Deck6 is 
as follows: 
b. Y-= ~o + ~1X1 + ~2X2 +~3X3 +~4Xt + ~sXs + ~06 + ~1X1 + e 
In this model, !:1 Y represents the change in personal per 
capita income (PPI) from year to year. ~0 is simply a constant, 
or intercept term, representing the value of the change in PPI 
when the X variables are zero. The variable X
1 
represents the 
previous year's PPI, as this is a likely determinant of next year's 
PPI. The variable X2 represents whether or not tort reform was 
6
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enacted in that particular year. It is a dummy variable that 
receives a value of zero if no reform occurred in that year and a 
value of one if reform did occur. In order to account for the likely 
lag that occurs from the time tort reform was enacted and when 
its economic impact is measurable, the reform dates are lagged 
using variables X3• X4• X5• and X6• These variables represent 
whether tort reform was enacted the previous year, two years 
ago, three years ago, orfour years ago respectively. The variable 
X7 represents whether or not reform was enacted in any year prior 
to the year attached to this variable. The coefficients of these 
variables provide for the measure of the impact of tort reform on 
the change in PPL The term e is simply the error term, which in 
this model is used to account for any other changes within a 
state's economy that may have led to a change in PPI. 
Compar1son of PPI 
~oor-----------~~~~--------~ 
e: I ====---. ~ >=>oo r----.,.-~7'9-::........------~ t=::::~=~ J 
~oor---------------------4 
Findings of the Study ' 
The chart above summarizes the results obtained by applying 
the model to the data collected7• The results show that tort 
reform, as defined by this study, does indeed have a slight impact 
on the change in PPI after the reform is enacted. After running 
a regression using the model described previously, one observes 
that the coefficients of the variables representing tort reform on 
a two and three year lag (X· and X ) are both positive and 
0 0 • 4 5 
statistically significant using a 95 percent confidence interval 
~See _Appendix 2). The actual coefficient for X4 is 163.02. This 
tmphes that tort reform is responsible for a $163.02 change in PPI 
~f tort reform was enacted two years prior. The coefficient for X5 
ts 204.11. This implies that tort reform is responsible for a 
$204. II change in PPI if tort reform was enacted three years 
prior. The coefficients for X , X , X , and X are all negative, 
0 0 2 3 6 7 
Implymg a negative impact on the change in PPI for that particular 
variable. This however is rejected by the author because it does 
not fall within the 95 percent confidence interval. 
The projected benefit to Arkansas from the Civil Justice 
Reform Act is an increase in the growth of PPI for 2005 and 2006 
(two and three years removed from the year the reform was 
enacted). The model employed in this research shows that there 
(2) Direct 
Impact on 
PPI 
' 
(3) 
Adjustment 
Phase 
v . . Tort Reform Benefit Cycle 
(1) 
Adjustment 
Phase 
K TortRdonn ~ Enacted 
(4) Direct 
Impact on 
PPI 
Diminished 
is a positive change in the growth rate in these years with little or 
no effect on any prior or future year's PPI. Therefore, one may 
begin to develop a time line for when tort reform begins to impact 
the economy. This time line is reflected above in the Tort Reform 
Benefit Cycle. Within the first two years of the reform, businesses, 
insurers, healthcare providers, and ordinary citizens enter into an 
adjustinent phase (1) in which insurance premiums and the cost 
of doing business begins to decrease. Eventually, this decrease 
is passed on to employees in the form of higher wages and to 
consumers in the form oflower prices (2). This research implies 
that the passing of the savings occurs in years three and four. 
After this time, it is reasonable to conclude that the economy 
adjusts to the original reforms made (3), and the change in PPI 
is no longer impacted directly by the reforms(4). 
By inserting PPI data into the model, one can calculate the 
per capita dollar impact of tort reform on personal income in 
Arkansas in the years 2005 and 2006. With the reforms in place, 
PPI for 2005 should total $26,577.34. Without the reforms, PPI 
would total $26,414.32. The total increase in PPI that can be 
attributed to the tort reforms passed in 2003 is $163.02. With the 
reforms in place, PPI for 2006 should total $27,833.95. Without 
the reforms, PPI would total $27,463.21. The total increase in 
PPI for 2006 attributable to tort reform is $370.74. After this 
time, the model predicts that none of the growth in PPI can be 
attributed to the tort reforms of 2003. However, although the 
direct impact on personal income is diminished after 2006, 
Arkansas' PPI would then grow from a higher level with the tort 
reform in place versus without. Thus, the actual dollar amount 
of growth and level of PPI is higher than had reform not been 
enacted for the foreseeable future. 
7
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Conclusion: 
As one can clearly see, tort reform is a complex and 
difficult issue. The sheer number of reforms and combinations 
of reforms possible is, simply put, mind-boggling. One thing is 
for certain: the debate as to whether or not tort reform provides 
an overall net positive for society is sure to surge ahead. Some 
will say that the impact on the economy and improved efficiency 
in the civil justice system provides enough evidence to conclude 
that tort reform should be enacted at every level. Others will say 
that by limiting the amount awarded in damages or eliminating 
the long standing precedence of things such as joint and several 
liability or the collateral source rule does nothing but hurt the 
very people the legal system is designed to protect. Above all 
else, this study will hopefully prove useful in its summary of the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003, and its impact on Arkansas' 
economy 
Endnotes: 
1 To read a summary of the entire case, see http://www .ican2000 .com/ 
statements I tort/ mcdonalds.html. 
2 This publication can be found at http:/ /www.ama-assn.org/ama/ 
pub/ category /14819.html. 
3 Data can be obtained from http:/ /www.bea.gov /bea/regional/ 
spi/ #download. 
4 Data can be obtained from http://www.atra.org/states/. 
5 Dr. Collins serves as Director for the Center for Business and 
Economic Research at the University of Arkansas' Sam M. Walton 
College of Business. 
6 Dr. Deck is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of 
Arkansas' Sam M. Walton College of Business. 
7 Results are summarized in Appendix 1. 
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Appendix 1. 
Year PPI with Tort Refonn PPI without Tort Refonn 
2003 24384.00 24384.00 
2004 25388.07 25388.07 
2005 26577.34 26414.32 
2006 27833.95 27463.21 
2007 28914.19 28535.27 
2008 30018.28 29630.99 
2009 31146.74 30750.91 
2010 32300.12 31895.55 
2011 33478.97 33065.46 
2012 34683.84 34261.20 
2013 35915.31 35483.34 
2014 37173.96 .. · 36732.46 
2015 38460.41 38009.16 
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Appendix 2. 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.41269447 
R Square 0.17031673 
Adjusted R SquarE 0.16688423 
Standard Error 405.819834 
Observations 1700 
AN OVA 
Regression 
Residual 
Total 
df ss 
7 57202085.54 
1692 278655035.7 
1699 335857121.2 
Coefficients Standard Error 
Intercept 
Last Years PPI 
Tort Reform 
Reform (t-1) 
Reform (t-2) 
Reform (t-3) 
Reform (t-4) 
Prior Reform 
Faculty comment: 
465.734185 20.72956871 
0.02207759 0.001445329 
-66.171214 68.95168299 
-34.590464 69.96783268 
163.022902 70.09402596 
204.112481 70.28123009 
-74.685266 70.51302106 
-45.996536 30.52463237 
MS 
8171726.51 
164689.737 
t Stat 
22.467143 
15.2751289 
-0.9596751 
-0.4943767 
2.32577456 
2.90422465 
-1.0591699 
-1.5068662 
In recommending Mr. Jackson's paper for publication, his 
mentor, John Norwood, made the following remarks. 
I am pleased to support the publication of Scott 
Jackson's paper in Inquiry. Scott's paper deals with 
the subject of Tort Reform in Arkansas. It is based on 
the tort reform act passed by the legislature in 2003. In 
the paper Scott reviews the most common components 
of tort reform legislation nationwide. He then discusses 
in details" the components of the tort reform law 
passed by the. Arkansas IEigislature in 2003. It is 
interesting to see how the Arkansas law is similar to 
those passed by other states; but is unique in a couple 
of aspects. · : ' 
By far the most interesting part of Scott's paper is an 
economic analysis in which he attempts to answer the 
question whether or not tort reform is good for 
F Significance F 
49.61891 8 1.9201 E-64 
P-va/ue Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0% 
4.816E-98 425.0758937 506.39248 425.075894 506.392477 
1.903E-49 0.019242767 0.0249124 0.01924277 0.02491241 
0.3373559 -201.410767 69.06834 -201.41077 69.0683401 
0.6211044 -171.82306 102.64213 -171.82306 102.642133 
0.0201482 25.54279455 300.50301 25.5427946 300.50301 
0.0037294 66.26519726 341.95976 66.2651973 341.959764 
0.2896736 -212.987177 63.616645 -212.98718 63.6166445 
0.1320316 -105.866542 13.87347 -105.86654 13.8734699 
Arkansas. Scott consulted with two economics 
professors here in the Walton College and with their 
help developed a model which might provide some 
insight as to whether tort reform is beneficial. The 
results of other states are reviewed, and Scott concludes 
with a prediction of what will be the economic results 
of tort reform in Arkansas. 
In summary, Scott did an outstanding job on this 
paper, both in terms of background research involving 
an immense number of hours in the library, and 
considerable effort in developing an economic model. 
This was not surprising to me, as I have worked with 
Scott for many years in my capacity as director of the 
honors program. Scott is a superior student, and will 
be graduating next week Summa Cum Laude and as 
a First Ranked Senior Scholar. After graduation he 
will continue his studies in iaw school. 
9
Jackson: A Study of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003: Can Tort Reform
Published by ScholarWorks@UARK, 2005
